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HANDICAPPED LAW-EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE STATES TO PROVIDE BEST POS-
SIBLE OPTION. Springdale School District No. 50 v. Grace, 693 F.2d
41 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2086 (1983).
The appellant, Springdale School District, determined that the
most appropriate education for Sherry Grace, a deaf student,' in-
cluded a certified teacher of the deaf and placement at the Arkansas
School for the Deaf in Little Rock. 2 Sherry's parents agreed with
the recommendation for a certified teacher, but challenged the deci-
sion for placement at the Deaf School.3 Although school district
officials emphasized that Sherry's below level general knowledge
and academic skills necessitated placement at the Arkansas School
for the Deaf, the Graces desired that Sherry be educated in the Spr-
ingdale School District where she could live at home4 and sought
review of the decision.' A hearing officer found that Sherry's educa-
tional needs could be met within the Springdale School District and
the Arkansas Department of Education agreed. The school district
appealed to federal district court seeking review of the hearing of-
ficer's decision.'
The district court held that the Springdale School district could
provide an appropriate education for Sherry.8 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.' The United States Supreme Court" va-
cated and remanded the Eighth Circuit's decision to be decided in
light of Board of Education v. Rowley. " Upon remand, the Eighth
Circuit found its earlier decision to be consistent with Rowley and
1. Sherry Grace has a 95 per cent hearing loss which renders her profoundly deaf. The
loss was discovered at two years of age before she developed speech. Springdale School
Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 494 F. Supp. 266, 267 (W.D. Ark. 1980).
2. Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41, 42 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 2086 (1983).
3. 1d.
4. Sherry's education at the Arkansas School for the Deaf would require residential
placement because of the 200 miles between Springdale and Little Rock.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id
8. 494 F. Supp. at 273.
9. Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1981).
10. Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (1982).
11. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). For discussion, see infra notes 77-100 and accompanying
text.
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affirmed.' 2 The Eighth Circuit found that a state was not required
to provide a student with the best possible education 3 under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act's' 4 definition of a
"free appropriate education."'" Although placement at the Deaf
School might provide Sherry with the best education, Sherry's edu-
cation in the Springdale School District not only met the "appropri-
ate education" requirements under the Act, but also served the Act's
mainstreaming purposes by allowing her to be educated with non-
handicapped persons.' 6 Springdale School District No. 50 v. Grace,
693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2086 (1983).
Historically, education of the handicapped was largely ig-
nored."' Handicapped children were excluded from schools when
deemed unable to profit from education' 8 and were barred by
courts' 9 and state statutes20 from public education. Courts preferred
to leave education to the discretion of state and local agencies. 2'
The high costs and specialized materials22 required to educate hand-
icapped children provided little incentive to states with limited re-
sources. 23  Although the Supreme Court recognized in Brown v.
Board of Education24 that "it is doubtful that an child may reason-
12. 693 F.2d at 41.
13. Id at 43.
14. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976)).
15. For discussion, see infra note 59 and accompanying text.
16. 693 F.2d at 43.
17. For historical analysis, see generally Colley, The Education/orAl Handicapped Chil-
dren Act (EH,4) 4 Statutory and Legal Anaysis, 10 J.L. & EDuC. 137 (1981); Krass, The
Right to Public Education/or Handicapped Children: A Primerfor the New Advocate, 1976 U.
ILL. L.F. 1016; Miller, The Handicapped Childs Civil Right as it Relates to the "Least Restric-
tive Environment" and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1 (1978); Comment, The
Handicapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REV. 637 (1976).
18. Eg., Cuyahoga County Assoc. for Retarded Children and Adults v. Essex, 411 F.
Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976)(upholding a state statute allowing exclusion of handicapped
children from public schools when determined unable to profit).
19. See Beattie v. Board of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919); and Watson v.
City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893)(excluding handicapped children from
schools). All States and the District of Columbia provide a system of public education.
Krass, supra note 17, at 1027 n.59, 1028 n.69.
20. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1504 (1947). This statute exempted most handicapped
children with the exception of the deaf and blind.
21. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
22. On the average, a handicapped child is twice as expensive to educate as a non-
handicapped child. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1439.
23. Prior to passage of the Act, decisions in more than 36 cases recognized the right of
the handicapped to an education, but States lacked financial resources to comply. Id at 7,
reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1431.
24. 347 U.S. at 483.
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ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education,"25 handicapped children were continually denied ac-
cess to a public education.26
In 1966, Congress addressed education for the handicapped by
establishing grant programs to assist states in initiating, expanding,
and improving programs for the handicapped. 27  The programs
were replaced in 1970, by the Education for Handicapped Act
28
which provided for additional grant programs. Vague guidelines
for the use of funds lessened the Act's impact,29 however, and public
education for the handicapped continued to develop at a slow pace.
In the early 1970's, two federal cases, Pennsylvania Association
for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania ° and Mills v. Board
of Education,31 recognized a constitutional right for education of the
handicapped and provided the impetus for enactment of the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.32 PARC involved a
suit brought on behalf of mentally retarded children excluded by
state statutes from Pennsylvania schools. 33 The statutes, which de-
nied education to uneducable and untrainable retarded children,
were challenged as violative of the due process34 and equal protec-
tion35 clauses of the fourteenth amendment in that children were not
afforded notice of a hearing before program changes or exclusions
were made 36 and categories employed to classify students as men-
tally retarded lacked a rational basis.37 The case was resolved
through a consent decree which required the state to provide an ed-
25. Id at 493.
26. Krass, supra note 17, at 1026-42.
27. Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966).
28. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970).
29. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1429.
30. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modoied, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
31. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
32. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
33. 343 F. Supp. at 281-82.
34. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1, provides in pertinent part: "[Nlor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
35. "[Nlor deny to any person within [the State's] jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." Id
36. 343 F. Supp. at 293. One student learned of his exclusion from school when the bus
no longer picked him up. Id
37. Id at 296-97. The court relied on expert testimony that stated "all mentally re-
tarded persons are capable of benefitting from a program of education and training." Id at
296. Classifications which barred retarded children from school because of severity were
possibly not rational. Id at 292, 297.
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ucation for retarded children regardless of the severity. 38 The de-
cree set standards for locating children who had not previously
benefitted from a public education 39 and emphasized that regular
classroom placements were preferrable to special classrooms and
residential schools.' While the district court did not decide the con-
stitutional issues presented in PARC it did consider the allegations
and found that the mentally retarded children had presented a "col-
orable claim" under both the due process4' and equal protection
clauses.42
In Mills, 43 a class of handicapped children sought to enjoin the
District of Columbia school district from excluding them from
schools and to compel the district to provide education or alterna-
tive placements at public expense." The court held that equal pro-
tection guaranteed handicapped children an education regardless of
mental, physical or emotional disability. 45 A handicapped child
could not be excluded from educational benefits and opportunities
provided other students.46 The court further decided that the denial
of hearings and periodic reviews violated due process rights.47
In 1974, Congress, dissatisfied with the progress in meeting the
needs of the handicapped,48 enacted Education of the Handicapped
Act.49 This Act was an interim measure to allow further study for a
more comprehensive Act.5" In 1975, the Education for All Handi-
38. Id at 285.
39. Id at 285-86.
40. Id at 307.
41. Id at 295.
42. ld at 297.
43. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
44. Id at 868.
45. Id at 878.
46. Id To reach this decision, the court considered Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (disallowing arbitrary deprivation of education); Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S.
483 (1954); and Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)(finding equal opportu-
nity a component of due process).
47. 348 F. Supp. at 878.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3,4 (1975). For discussion and analy-
sis, see Colley, supra note 17, at 139-43; Keim, The Education forA4l Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 110 (1976); Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 213 (1980); Note,
Enforcing the right to an Appropriate Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1103 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Enforcing the Right];
Note, Springdale School Dirtrict No. 50 Y. Grace.- "Appropriate Education" Under the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 950 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Springdale School: "Appropriate Education"].
49. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 579, 583 (1974).
50. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975).
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capped Children Act5 l was enacted creating an enforceable federal
right for handicapped children to receive a "free appropriate public
education."52 The Act made litigation of constitutional issues unnec-
essary by codifying statutory rights for education of the handi-
capped.53 The Act and its implementing regulations 54 established
priorities for locating and providing services for handicapped chil-
dren55  and set time limits for meeting the needs of the
handicapped. 6
To implement the Act, Congress instituted a method of federal
funding to assist state and local agencies in educating the handi-
capped.57 To qualify for federal financial assistance, a state has to
"demonstrate. . . a policy that assures all handicapped children the
right to a 'free appropriate public education.'"58 A "free appropri-
ate public education"59 is accomplished through special education
and related services tailored to a child's individual needs by an Indi-
vidualized Education Plan (IEP).6 ° "Special education" is defined
51. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1401-1461 (1976)).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976). For definition of "free appropriate public education,"
see infra note 59 and accompanying text.
53. Note, Enforcing the Right, supra note 48, at 1105.
54. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.754 (1981).
55. Congressional findings as codified in the Act revealed "more than eight million
handicapped children in the United States." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1) (Supp. 1983). "[T]he
special needs of such children" were not being "fully met." Id at § 1400(b)(2). Congress
expressed that "it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and
local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in
order to assure equal protection of the law." Id. at § 1400(b)(9).
56. Id § 1412(2)(B). "[A] free appropriate public education will be available for all
handicapped children between the ages of three and eighteen within the State not later than
September 1, 1978, and for all handicapped children between the ages of three and twenty-
one by September 1, 1980." Id
57. Id § 1412.
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(l)(1976). Forty-nine states have elected to participate by receiving
federal funds. Only New Mexico has declined to accept the funds. Levinson, The Right to a
Minimally Adequate Education/or Learning Disabled Children, 12 VAL. U.L. REV. 253, 277
n.135 (1978).
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976). "The term 'free appropriate public education' means
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense,
under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the
State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individ-
ualized education program .. " Id
60. Id § 1401 (19). "The term 'individualized education program' means a written
statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the
local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to pro-
vide or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of
handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever
appropriate, such child, which statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels
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as "specially designed instruction. . . to meet the unique needs of a
handicapped child including classroom instruction and instruction
in hospitals and institutions."'61 Along with special education serv-
ices, schools are to provide related services such as transportation
and other support services required for a handicapped child to bene-
fit from special education.62 Congress designated children entitled
to free appropriate public education by defining "handicapped chil-
dren" as those who are "mentally retarded, hard-of-hearing, deaf,
speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally dis-
turbed, orthopedically impaired,. . . other health impaired, or chil-
dren with specific learning disabilities, who by reason of their
handicap, require special education and related services. '63 The ed-
ucation must be provided first to handicapped children who are not
receiving an education and second, to severely handicapped chil-
dren receiving an inadequate education.' 4 Further, "to the maxi-
mum extent appropriate, . . the handicapped must be educated
with students who are not handicapped. 65
To additionally assure appropriate educations, Congress en-
acted procedural safeguards. 66 Parents or guardians must be pro-
vided with an opportunity to examine records related to
identification, evaluation and placement 67 and to participate in pro-
gram preparation.68 Notice must be given concerning program
changes.69 Complaints may be brought relating to procedures and
impartial due process hearings held.70 Decisions may be reviewed
by state educational agencies7' and appealed to state and federal
district courts.72
of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-
term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be pro-
vided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular
educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such
services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for
determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being
achieved." Id.
61. Id § 1401(16).
62. Id § 1401(17).
63. Id § 1401(1).
64. Id. § 1412(3).
65. Id § 1412(5).
66. Id § 1415.
67. Id § 1415(b)(A).
68. Id § 1401(9).
69. Id § 1415(b)(C).
70. Id § 1415(b)(2).
71. Id § 1415(c).
72. Id § 1415(e).
576 [Vol. 6:571
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Even though the Act emphasizes needs and programming for
the handicapped, courts have had difficulty defining the Act's mean-
ing of a free appropriate public education.73 Definitions have en-
compassed objectives of self-sufficiency,74 maximum potential,"5
and most appropriate alternatives. 76 Not until Board of Education v.
Rowley, 77 however, did the Supreme Court consider the interpreta-
tion of a free appropriate public education in light of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act.
The facts of Rowley were analogous to Springdale School Dis-
trict No. 50 v. Grace.78 The parents of Amy Rowley, a deaf student
with excellent lip-reading skills, insisted that Amy be provided with
a qualified sign-language interpreter. 79 Amy, who used a hearing
aid in classes and received instruction from a tutor for the deaf and
a speech therapist, was making above average grades in her classes
and school administrators did not find the need for an interpreter.80
An independent hearing officer determined that an interpreter was
not necessary because "Amy was achieving educationally, academi-
cally and socially" without such assistance. 81 The New York Com-
missioner of Education agreed.8 2 The Rowleys then brought suit in
federal district court83 claiming that a denial of an interpreter con-
stituted denial of a free appropriate public education pursuant to the
Act.
84
The district court found that although Amy was making pro-
gress, there was a discrepancy between her achievement and poten-
73. See, Note, Springdale School "Appropriate Education", supra note 48, at 950, 957-
62.
74. E.g., Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded on other
grounds sub nom., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), on remandsub nom.,
Armstrong v. Kline, 513 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1980)(goal of appropriate education is for
handicappd children to become self-sufficient); Campbell v. Talladega County Board of
Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (appropriate education must embody goal of self-
sufficiency).
75. E.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981)(appro-
priate education must allow each child to reach maximum potential); Pinkerton v. Moye,
509 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 198 1)(appropriate education requires maximization of a child's
capabilities).
76. Eg., DeWalt v. Burkholder, 3 E.H.L.R. 551:550 (E.D. Va. 1980).
77. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
78. 693 F.2d 41 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2086 (1983).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 3039.
80. Id.
81. Id at 3040.
82. Id
83. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. N.Y. 1980), a1 7'dper curiam, 632
F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
84. 483 F. Supp. at 529.
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tial.85 After defining "free appropriate public education" to mean
"an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with
the opportunity provided other children,"86 the district court deter-
mined that Amy could not reach her potential without a sign-lan-
guage interpreter.8 7  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.88 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.80
In reviewing the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court
first examined legislative history to determine the meaning of the
Act's requirement of a free appropriate public education. 90 Con-
trary to the lower courts' findings, the Court concluded that a free
appropriate public education "consists of educational instruction
specifically designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped
child, supported by such services which are necessary to permit the
child 'to benefit' from instruction." 91 An educational agency is not
required to maximize each child's potential to be commensurate
with the opportunities provided other children, 92 but rather to pro-
vide equal access to public schools through a "basic floor of oppor-
tunity."93 The Court emphasized that a basic floor is established
when a handicapped child is given access to specialized instruction
and related services which are individually designed to provide edu-
cational benefits.94
The Court conceded that it is difficult to determine when a
child is receiving educational benefits.95 No single test may be used
because of facts and circumstances unique to each case.96 However,
the Court provided a two-part inquiry for purposes of judicial re-
view. 97 First, has the state complied with the procedures set forth in
the Act;98 second, is the Individualized Education Plan developed
85. Id at 534.
86. Id.
87. Id
88. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 947 (1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct.
3034 (1982).
89. 102 S. Ct. at 3034.
90. Id at 3041.
91. Id
92. Id at 3042.
93. Id. at 3047. The Court stated, "[N]either the Act nor its history persuasively
demonstrate that Congress thought that equal protection required any more than equal ac-
cess." Id
94. Id. at 3048.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3048-49.
97. Id at 3051.
98. The Court stated that this inquiry will require determination that a state has
adopted a state plan, policies and assurances required by the Act and also that the state has
[Vol. 6:571
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through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits?9 9 If both are answered affirm-
atively, a state has complied with the Act and courts can require no
more. 100
The Court determined that a sign-language interpreter was not
necessary in order for Amy to receive a free appropriate public edu-
cation.' Amy's parents had been provided ample procedural re-
views. 10 2 She was progressing easily from grade to grade with the
personalized instruction she was already receiving. 0 3 Because the
program was reasonably calculated to benefit her educationally,
Amy's educational program was consistent with the Act's
standards. '01
In Springdale, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
two-part inquiry ofRowley. 05 First, the court determined that the
state had complied with the Act's procedures.106 An Individualized
Education Plan had been developed for Sherry stating her specific
educational needs.0 7 When her parents challenged the provision
for placement at the Arkansas School for the Deaf, they received a
hearing before an impartial hearing officer.'0 8 Springdale School
District properly appealed the decision to the Coordinator of the
State Department of Education"° and later to the district court"0
and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals."'
Second, the court explored the major issue of whether the Indi-
vidualized Education Plan was reasonably calculated to enable
Sherry to receive educational benefits." 2 The school district argued
that it was unreasonable for them to bear the cost of establishing a
program for Sherry with one readily available at the School for the
created an individualized Education Plan for a child which conforms with the requirements
of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19). Id at 3051, n.27.
99. The inquiry for this part includes determination that achievement has occurred.
Id, n.28.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 3052.
102. Id
103. Id. at 3049, n.25.
104. Id at 3052.
105. 693 F.2d at 42-43.
106. Id. at 43.
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Id
110. 494 F. Supp. at 266.
111. 656 F.2d at 300.
112. 693 F.2d at 43.
19831 579
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Deaf.1 "3 In rejecting their arguments, the court emphasized that the
Springdale School District had disregarded the mainstreaming di-
rectives of the Supreme Court in Rowley." 4 Sherry's education in
the Springdale School District would allow interaction with non-
handicapped students, an opportunity not available at the School
for the Deaf.' 5
Remaining consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Rowley, the Eighth Circuit limited its review to the instructional
program established by the state education department which pro-
vided that Sherry would receive a certified instructor for the deaf
and other support services along with academic and communication
instruction. 11 6 The court stated, "Although the School for the Deaf
may offer the best educational opportunities for educating Sherry,
the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Act does not require
states to make available the best possible option.""' 7 The option
made available to Sherry was appropriate. In spite of the expenses
the Springdale School District would incur, the cost to the district
did not justify judicial intervention." 8 The Individualized Educa-
tion Plan established by the state department of education would
allow Sherry to receive a "free appropriate public education."' 1 9
Further, Sherry's placement in the Springdale School District would
provide mainstreaming opportunities as directed by the Act.'20
The Eighth Circuit's adherence to the Rowley standards exem-
plifies the impact of the Supreme Court's definition of a free appro-
priate public education under the Act.' 2 ' Although a "most
appropriate" standard was rejected by the Supreme Court, the
Court did require that a handicapped child's program must confer
113. Id
114. Id Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1461, "mainstreaming" is the preference that "a child is being educated in the regu-
lar classrooms of a public school system. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3049.
115. 693 F.2d at 43.
116. Id
117. Id Emphasis in the original.
118. Id at 43-44.
119. Id at 43.
120. Id at 42-43.
121. See Tucker, Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v.
Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12 J.L. & EDUc. 235 (1983); Note, "ppropriate Education"for Handi-
capped Children in the Eighth Circuit.- 4 Casenote on Springdale School District v. Grace, 35
ARK. L. REV. 519 (1981); Note, The Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975
Requires Beneficial, Not Equal Educational Opportunity Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S C.
3034 (1982), 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 631, 647 (1983).
[Vol. 6:571
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educational benefits in order to be appropriate. 122 Because determi-
nation of benefits must be made on an individual basis, 12 more dis-
cretion has been left to school districts and education agencies. 124
School districts may be free to balance a number of factors when
developing programs from which students may receive educational
benefits.
Education agencies may have an advantage over the handi-
capped, their parents and their advocates. 25 Commentators have
suggested that if a district complies with the Rowley criteria includ-
ing procedural safeguards, their educational decisions will probably
be affirmed by courts. 26 Recent caseholdings suggest that parents
may have a greater burden of proof placed upon them when chal-
lenging programs through procedural channels. 127 The Springdale
decision, however, may provide encouragement to parents who
would otherwise be reluctant to question their child's placement at
the school district level. The fact that the hearing officer and state
education agency disagreed with the school district implies that edu-
cational agencies are capable of impartial reviews, lessening the
need for judicial intervention.
States may be required to accept a larger role in determining
appropriate education. 28 Litigation may shift from federal to state
courts for interpretations of appropriate education under state stat-
utes. 29 State statutes may set more stringent requirements for ap-
propriate education standards that the Act requires. 30 Harrell v.
Wilson City Schools 131 held that the Supreme Court's definition of a
free appropriate public education did not control interpretation of a
state statute intended to provide each handicapped child an oppor-
tunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with that given
other children. 32 Although the wording of an Arkansas statute re-
122. 102 S. Ct. at 3046, 3049.
123. Stotland, E.-.L.R. Analysis: The Aftermath of Rowley-Business as Usual, CUR-
RENT E.H.L.R. DEC. AC-159, AC-163 (July, 1982); DuBow, E.H.LR. Analysis: Application
of Rowley by Courts and SEA's, CURRENT E.H.L.R. DEC. SA-107, SA-1 13 (April, 1983).
124. 102 S. Ct. at 3051.
125. DuBow, supra note 124, at SA-108.
126. Id
127. See, e.g., Frank v. Grover, CURRENT E.H.L.R. DEC. 554:148 (Cir. Ct. Wis.
1982)(school's proposed educational program was supported against parent's wishes).
128. See Summary and Analysis, E.HLR. Analysis: What Rowley Means, Current
E.H.L.R. DEC. SA-29, SA-37-SA-38 (Nov., 1982).
129. Id
130. Id.
131. CURRENT E.H.L.R. DEC. 554:125 (Ct. App. N.C. 1982).
132. Id at 554:127.
1983]
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quiring that "the most appropriate services" be made available
could suggest higher standards at the state level, 133 the Arkansas
statute has not been applied by courts reviewing compliance with
the Act's appropriate education provisions. 34
The Sprindale School District expressed concern that the ex-
pense of educating Sherry in her home school district might be un-
reasonable, 35 but the Eighth Circuit, in determining that Sherry
could receive an appropriate education in the Springdale District,
held that the cost would not be unreasonable. 36 Courts have con-
sidered the reasonableness of expenses, however, in reviewing ap-
propriate education cases. In Espino v. Besteiro,' 3 the cost of air
conditioning a classroom for a handicapped student was found to be
a reasonable expense, but the district court deciding the case sug-
gested that if the cost had been unreasonable, other alternatives
could have been considered.138
Conflicting views have been expressed concerning the educa-
tion of a deaf student with non-handicapped students.' 39 Although
Sherry Grace would be provided an opportunity to experience activ-
ities with non-handicapped students, communication difficulties
might hamper complete integration. The inability to communicate
with non-handicapped students may be more restrictive to a deaf
child than segregated placement in a facility for deaf students. 140
Conversely, placement in regular school settings may allow a deaf
student to become more proficient at communicating with hearing
persons. Because in either situation a student could arguably bene-
fit, either could be considered appropriate. Future litigation will es-
tablish not only further appropriate education standards, but also
133. "It shall be the responsibility of the school district and the State to provide the most
appropriate services based on careful evaluation of the child's needs. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-2123 (1980).
134. See Springdale School District No. 50 v. Grace, 494 F. Supp. 266, (W.D. Ark. 1980).
See also Harwell, The Education for All Handicapped Children's Act-An Overview of
Problems in Implementation, Family Law Section Newsletter, Oct., 1983, at 16, 18.
135. 693 F.2d at 43.
136. Id
137. 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
138. Id at 911. See also Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 1981)(empha-
sizing the importance of balancing the needs of handicapped individuals against the realities
of limited funding).
139. See Large, supra note 48, at 269-71; and Tucker, supra note 122, at 244.
140. Large, supra note 48, at 271.
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the influences exerted by state and local education agencies and the
judicial system on the standards.
Linda Joyce Bradley

